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Abstract:  
We study a simple, microfounded macroeconomic system in which the monetary authority 
employs a Taylor-type policy rule. We analyze situations in which the self-confirming 
equilibrium is unique and learnable according to Bullard and Mitra (2002). We explore the 
prospects for the use of ‘large deviation’ theory in this context, as employed by Sargent 
(1999) and Cho, Williams, and Sargent (2002). We show that our system can sometimes 
depart from the self-confirming equilibrium towards a non-equilibrium outcome characterized 
by persistently low nominal interest rates and persistently low inflation. Thus we generate 
events that have some of the properties of “liquidity traps” observed in the data, even though 
the policymaker remains committed to a Taylor-type policy rule which otherwise has 
desirable stabilization properties. 
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 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Overview
In the recent literature on monetary policy in microfounded models, there
has been a great deal of discussion concerning nominal interest rate feed-
back rules as a guide for policymakers.1 Generally speaking, the advice
emanating from this literature has been that central banks could achieve
near-optimal macroeconomic outcomes if they committed to a Taylor-type
policy rule that has a certain property. This property is what Woodford
(2001) dubs the “Taylor principle”–the rule must call for the central bank
to change nominal interest rates suﬃciently aggressively in response to in-
ﬂation developments in the economy.2 The conventional wisdom is thus
that a monetary authority implementing a rule obeying the Taylor princi-
ple would probably do quite well with respect to minimizing ﬂuctuations
in inﬂation and real output.
In this paper we explore the robustness of this conventional wisdom to
small departures from the extreme rationality assumptions that underlie it.
We want to take a ﬁrst step in this literature toward understanding how
certain types of minor misspeciﬁcations along with agent learning might
combine to change the global dynamics of the economy in unexpected ways.
To pose this question, we start with a workhorse model from this literature,
in order to remain generally consistent with other authors in this area. We
endow the policymakers with a commitment to a policy rule obeying the
Taylor principle. Thus, in a conventional analysis, we would conclude that
this monetary policy was close to the optimal one. We alter the economy
relative to this benchmark, in part by allowing the agents to use a slightly
misspeciﬁed model of the economy, and in part by allowing the agents to
learn over time instead of endowing them with rational expectations. In
this altered economy, we ﬁnd that the Taylor-type policy rule can still
at the Texas Monetary Economics Conference, Midwest Macroeconomics, Princeton
University, Federal Reserve Macro System Committe, and the Society for Economic Dy-
namics for helpful comments. In addition, we thank the organizers and participants
at the conference “Expectations, Learning, and Monetary Policy,” sponsored by the
Deutsche Bundesbank and the Center for Financial Studies, in Frankfurt, Germany, for
support and insightful comments.
1For a sample of the recent work, see Taylor (1993), the volumes edited by Taylor
(1999) and King and Plosser (1999), and the survey by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999).
2This is sometimes also referred to as an “active” policy rule.
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be quite successful, as the economy can remain in a small neighborhood
of the unique self-conﬁrming equilibrium for long periods of time. But
we also provide conditions under which the system may abruptly escape
from a neighborhood of that equilibrium towards a persistent low-nominal-
interest-rate, non-equilibrium outcome. This escape outcome has some of
the “liquidity trap” characteristics present in Japanese data from the 1990s,
which we now describe.
1.2. The specter of Japan
During the middle-to-late 1980s, the Japanese economy was widely ad-
mired in the business press and among academics. It had grown rapidly
for many years, and seemed to threaten U.S. world economic leadership.
But Japanese success faded in the 1990s as the economy became mired in
a cycle of poor performance. One of the features of the 1990s Japanese
experience was a sharp decline in short-term nominal interest rates. Figure
1 shows annualized three-month unregulated time deposit rates in Japan
from 1990 through 2000. These rates have remained below one percent
per annum since 1995, after beginning the decade near four percent. The
low nominal interest rates have been associated with low inﬂation rates.
Consumer prices were rising at a rate of 3 to 4 percent per year in Japan
at the beginning of the 1990s, but the inﬂation rate has fallen to between
±1 percent since 1995, when measured as a percent increase from the pre-
vious year (the exception is 1997, when it rose to about two percent). Real
performance has been poor during the 1990s, especially when compared to
earlier decades.3
Policymaking at the Bank of Japan is sometimes suspected of causing
the change of fortunes. To critics, if the Bank of Japan had somehow
behaved diﬀerently than it did, the 1990s Japanese experience might have
been avoided. A diﬃcult aspect of the critics’ view is that the Bank of
Japan did not appear to behave very diﬀerently during the 1990s than it
had during the earlier, more successful periods for the economy. If the Bank
3Summers (1991) has argued that low nominal interest rates leave the economy more
vulnerable to negative shocks, since monetary policymakers targeting nominal interest
rates can do little when an adverse shock is realized.ESCAPIST POLICY RULES 3
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FIG. 1. Short-term nominal interest rates in Japan during the 1990s fell
dramatically, in tandem with the CPI inﬂation rate.
of Japan’s policy rule was the right one during the successful periods, why
was essentially the same policy rule the wrong one during the 1990s?
This paper has a lot to say about this type of question. We view Japanese
monetary policymakers as using essentially the same monetary policy rule
during the 1990s as they did during the earlier portions of the postwar era.4
In fact, the policymakers in our model follow a Taylor-type policy rule from
which they never deviate. This is of course an extreme assumption, but
it is also a strength of our analysis, because it makes it clear that our
dynamics are not generated by a change in the policy rule. Instead, the
system endogenously deviates from the targeted equilibrium toward the
liquidity trap outcome. As we will discuss in detail in the main text of the
paper, under certain circumstances a self-reinforcing process can begin in
the neighborhood of the self-conﬁrming equilibrium, propelling the system
4We could also think in terms of U.S. data. In the U.S., short-term nominal interest
rates fell precipitously during the Great Depression and remained near zero for many
years. See Wheelock (1991) for a discussion of the hypothesis that monetary policymak-
ers at the time did not alter their operating procedure in any fundamental way.4 JAMES BULLARD AND IN-KOO CHO
far from the targeted outcome. From the perspective of the agents in
the model, this turn of events would be puzzling, since the policy rule is
unchanged and produced quite good performance for a long period of time.5
1.3. What we do
We begin with a standard New Keynesian model as described by Wood-
ford (1999, 2003) and Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999). We introduce
learning into this economy, following the analysis of Bullard and Mitra
(2002). We restrict attention to situations under which the targeted equi-
librium of the central bank would be both determinate and learnable under
their analysis. We then look for circumstances under which the stability
under learning might break down, and cause the system to visit a low nom-
inal interest rate, low inﬂation outcome, like the ones displayed in Figure
1.6 We use ‘large deviation’ theory as employed by Sargent (1999) and Cho,
Williams, and Sargent (2002) to generate these departures, or “escapes.”
We spend much of the paper documenting that the escape dynamics de-
pend on three factors. These factors are (1) A certain misspeciﬁcation on
the part of the private sector regarding the actions of the policy authori-
ties, (2) Feedback from the beliefs of the private sector to the actions of the
policy authority, and (3) A learning rule that reﬂects the private sector’s
doubt about the accuracy of their speciﬁcation. We think these factors are
plausibly at work in actual economies.
1.4. Recent related literature
Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001) argued that the interaction
between an active Taylor-type rule, a Fisher relation, and a zero bound on
nominal interest rates helps explain liquidity trap outcomes through the
creation of a low inﬂation steady state. Our explanation is quite diﬀerent
5We are describing unintentionally low nominal interest rates as undesirable. Low
nominal interest rates have sometimes been associated with poor economic performance
in actual economies like Japan. In many contexts in monetary theory, however, low
nominal interest rates are welfare-improving. We think of our problem as one where,
for reasons exogenous to the model, the nominal interest rate and the inﬂation rate
associated with the self-conﬁrming equilibrium are socially optimal, and the goal of
the government is to cause these values to come about. The large deviation from this
equilibrium is then inadvertent and unwanted.
6Another way to put our primary question is to ask, “What assumptions are necessary
to generate escape dynamics in this popular environment?”ESCAPIST POLICY RULES 5
from theirs, because we focus on a model with a single steady state and
generate large deviations from that unique stable equilibrium point. For
analyses of learning in environments more directly related to Benhabib, et
al., (2001), see McCallum (2003), Eusepi (2003), and Evans and Honkapo-
hja (2003). These latter authors discuss the circumstances under which the
Benhabib, et al. (2001) liquidity trap equilibrium might be learnable.
The analysis here has the private sector learning and the central bank
following a stipulated policy. For analyses in which the roles are reversed,
see, for instance, Sargent (1999) and Wieland (2000).
2. ENVIRONMENT
2.1. A baseline economy
We study a model economy based on Woodford (1999, 2003). We use
this model because (1) it is relatively simple, which facilitates our learn-
ing analysis, (2) it has been derived from microfoundations in Woodford
and Rotemberg (1998) and elsewhere, (3) it is a workhorse model in the
literature on monetary policy rules, which helps our argument that large
deviation theory can be quite relevant for current policymaking. We also
think the ideas we illustrate using this model would be equally applicable
in related frameworks.
In our economy, economic time series are being generated in a manner
subtly diﬀerent from the world that the private sector agents perceive.
However, the self-conﬁrming equilibrium of the model has the private sec-
tor’s perceptions veriﬁed by actual events, so that they do not discover
the nature of their misspeciﬁed view of the economy. In order to build this
type of model, we ﬁrst show how the time series being generated depend on
the perceptions of the agents, and then how the agents’ perceptions diﬀer
from this reality. The actual evolution of the economy then depends on the
interaction between these two dynamics.
Woodford’s (1999, 2003) framework consists of two equations which are
log-linear approximations to the ﬁrst-order conditions for household and
ﬁrm maximization problems in his economy. The households have a stan-
dard intertemporal optimization problem which yields a consumption Eu-
ler equation given by equation (1). The monopolistically competitive ﬁrms6 JAMES BULLARD AND IN-KOO CHO
face frictions in setting nominal prices, and their proﬁt maximization con-
ditions yield equation (2). Woodford’s framework represents a simpliﬁed
linearization about a steady state expressed in terms of the level of output
z, the inﬂation rate π, and the nominal interest rate r:
zd
t = ˜ Etzd
t+1 − σ−1
³
rd
t − ˜ Etπd
t+1
´
+ wt (1)
πd
t = κzd
t + β ˜ Etπd
t+1 (2)
where
wt = αwt−1 +  t, (3)
and ηt and  t a r eG a u s s i a nw h i t en o i s et e r m s .W el e tzd
t = zt − ¯ zt,π d
t =
πt − ¯ πt, and rd
t = rt − ¯ rt, so that all variables are expressed as deviations
from target or long-run values at time t denoted by ¯ zt, ¯ πt and ¯ rt.W el e t˜ Et
be a (possibly nonrational) expectations operator representing the private
sector’s views of the future. The parameters σ, relating to the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution of the representative household, κ, relating to
the degree of price stickiness in the economy, and β, the common household
discount factor, are all ﬁxed and positive. We think of equations (1) and
(2) as describing the optimizing behavior of the private sector, given their
expectations, in Woodford’s (1999) framework.
Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) argue that the coeﬃcients σ−1,β ,and
κ are invariant to the policy rule chosen by the monetary authorities for
the determination of rt, and they supplement these equations with vari-
ous forms of Taylor-type policy rules to close the model. We follow their
procedure. We use a Taylor-type policy rule
rd
t = φππd
t + ηt. (4)
with
φπ > 1 (5)
ﬁxed where ηt is white noise, representing an unexpected shock to the
nominal interest rate. The fact that φπ > 1 means that this policy rule is
“active” in the nomenclature of the literature. We will sometimes refer toESCAPIST POLICY RULES 7
φπ as the “degree of hawkishness” in the policy rule, because it describes
how aggressively the policy authority reacts to deviations of inﬂation from
target. Also, since the coeﬃcient φπ is ﬁxed, and the functional form is
also ﬁxed, the policymaker is completely committed to the use of the active
Taylor-type policy rule. This is an important feature of our model which we
will come back to throughout the paper.7 Equation (4) may be rewritten
in the form
rt = φ0 + φππt + ηt (6)
where φ0 ≡ (1 − φπ)¯ πt + ρ.
We supplement this model with a description of how the long-run or
target values ¯ zt, ¯ πt, or ¯ rt evolve over time. We think of the long-run level
of output ¯ z as a constant, and we think of the long-run nominal interest
rate as determined by a Fisher relation. Thus we have
¯ zt =¯ z ∀t, (7)
¯ rt =¯ πt + ρ (8)
where
ρ ≡ β
−1 − 1 (9)
is the ﬁxed, long-run real rate of interest. It therefore remains to describe
how the government goes about setting its inﬂation target ¯ πt.
One of our key assumptions is that we view the government as indiﬀer-
ent to the exact target level of inﬂation within any reasonable bounds.8
Because of this, the monetary authority is willing to acquiesce to a target
level of inﬂation which is expected by the private sector, so long as the
private sector expects some level that can be put under the rubric of “low
inﬂation.” We interpret policymakers in our model as having the view that
they do not want to spend time potentially destabilizing the economy by
trying to convince the public that the target is, say, 1.75 percent when the
7We do not impose an explicit lower bound on nominal interest rates, but we do ensure
that such a bound is never violated in our simulations.
8Actual central banks often announce target ranges, for instance, so that they might
be thought of as indiﬀerent to exactly what inﬂa t i o nr a t ei sa c h i e v e dw i t h i nt h er a n g e .8 JAMES BULLARD AND IN-KOO CHO
public thinks it is 2.25 percent. Our policymakers are indiﬀerent between
two such targets, and so, as a tie-breaking rule among potential targets,
they simply set their target to the one that the private sector expects. And
indeed, nearly all of the time in our model, the inﬂation rate will remain
close to the target that the private sector expects. We can express this
assumption simply as
¯ πt = π 
t (10)
where π 
t is the private sector’s perceived inﬂation target.
If the government adopted a ﬁxed target for inﬂation, then the escape
dynamics we describe in the remainder of the paper could not occur. We
need the “center of gravity” of the system to move slightly with incoming
shocks. This will be a key aspect of our generation of escape dynamics in
this framework. But–and this is quite important–the model with a ﬁxed
inﬂation target and the model with the moving target described here are
observationally equivalent at the self-conﬁrming equilibrium.9 Thus poli-
cymakers could argue, as many actually do, that a precise statement of a
numerical inﬂation target is not necessary to achieve satisfactory stabiliza-
tion performance. They would be right, most of the time. But the fact that
the inﬂation target moves slightly with incoming shocks opens the door to
the possibility of escape dynamics, as we will demonstrate.
We stress that the government in our model is not trying to outwit the
public. They behave mechanically. They are committed to using an active
Taylor-type policy rule. They are also committed to producing the long-run
level of inﬂation the public expects to get.
2.2. Private sector perceptions
The private sector agents in our model observe new data on output,
inﬂation, and nominal interest rates in each period. They are endowed
with a perceived law of motion for the economy, which is given by
zd
t = c11wt + c12ηt (11)
9In addition, under some plausible conditions, there would be no escape from the
self-conﬁrming equilibrium and hence the two models would always be observationally
equivalent. This is the case if private sector agents use recursive least squares algorithms,
as described below.ESCAPIST POLICY RULES 9
and
πd
t = c21wt + c22ηt. (12)
The set of coeﬃcients c =( cij)2
i,j=1 represent the beliefs of the private
sector about how output and inﬂation deviate from their respective targets.
This perceived model is a good one because it corresponds exactly to the
minimal state variable rational expectations equilibrium of this economy.
In endowing the private sector agents with the correct model of the equi-
librium law of motion for the economy, up to the coeﬃcients c, we are
following Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and other authors in the learning
literature. We are giving the agents a lot of information.10 The assumption
is very favorable to the agents being able to learn the rational expectations
equilibrium. If the agents cannot learn the equilibrium under this very fa-
vorable assumption, then it is called into question whether such an equilib-
rium could be stable under learning in an actual economy. The equilibrium
we study will indeed turn out to be learnable in the sense deﬁned by Evans
and Honkapohja (2001). Thus the “large deviation” dynamics we isolate
a r ea l lt h em o r er e m a r k a b l e . 11
The private sector agents assume that a Fisher relation holds so that
r 
t = ρ + π 
t. (13)
The private sector agents also correctly assume that
¯ zt =¯ z ∀t ≥ 1. (14)
By ﬁxing the mean of the real sector, we intentionally make any deviation
from an equilibrium more diﬃcult.
Our second key assumption concerns the nature of the private sector’s
beliefs concerning monetary policy. We use this belief to generate feedback
10Including knowledge of the shocks wt and ηt. But not as much information as under
rational expectations.
11We could, of course, study systems where the private sector agents do not have so
much information about the economy. The agents could use a misspeciﬁed model, for
instance, or they could be allowed only partial observation of information. But our idea
is to show that large deviation dynamics can occur even under the Evans-Honkapohja,
“minimal deviation from rational expectations” assumption for the agents’ perceived
law of motion.10 JAMES BULLARD AND IN-KOO CHO
between the perceptions of the private sector and the policy choices of the
government. This feedback will be critical in generating escape dynamics.
We assume the private sector believes that the monetary authority uses
a convex Taylor-type rule described by
rt = ψ (πt), (15)
where ψ
0 > 0, ψ
00 > 0,a n dψ (·) is invertible. The convexity of ψ (·) implies
that monetary policy responds more aggressively to inﬂation when inﬂation
is higher, and less aggressively when inﬂation is lower. The precise form
of the function ψ (·) describing beliefs is not necessary for our analysis.
Given the perceptions (11) and (12), the private sector agents only need a
conjecture for their perceived inﬂation target π 
t in order to compute πd
t.
To obtain π 
t, the private sector agents take the derivative of (15),
drt
dπt
= ψ
0 (πt), (16)
a n dt h e ni n v e r tt h i se q u a t i o nt oo b t a i n
πt =
¡
ψ
0¢−1
µ
drt
dπt
¶
. (17)
The private sector agents correctly conjecture from (12) that actual inﬂa-
tion πt on the left hand side is distributed about the inﬂation target π 
t.
On the right hand side, an estimate of drt/dπt can be found by computing
the coeﬃcients in the simple auxiliary12 regression
rt = ˆ φ0,t + ˆ φπ,tπt + ξt, (18)
where ξt is the regression residual, and using ˆ φπ,t as the estimate of drt/dπt.
Using these facts, a proxy for the inﬂation target based on equation (17) is
π 
t = δ0 + δ1ˆ φπ,t, (19)
where the right hand side is a linear approximation of
¡
ψ
0¢−1 ³
ˆ φπ,t
´
.
12It is auxiliary to the regression deﬁned by equations (11) and (12), as we discuss
below.ESCAPIST POLICY RULES 11
Once the private sector sets π 
t,r  
t is determined by equation (13). Then,
agents can calculate πd
t = πt −π 
t from observed πt to solve (11) and (12).
We now turn to the question of how the actual environment interacts with
the perceptions of the agents to generate a stationary equilibrium.
3. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
3.1. Self-conﬁrming equilibrium
The private sector’s model can be parameterized by c =( cij)2
i,j=1 and
φ =( φ0,φ π). T os u r v i v eal o n gs e r i e so fo b s e r v e dd a t a ,(c,φ) must be
consistent with the observations statistically. This consistency will deter-
mine the “equilibrium” model of the private agents. While this sort of
consistency between the subjective beliefs of the decision maker and the
observed data is one of the two pillars of rational expectations, our equi-
librium concept diﬀers from rational expectations equilibrium in the sense
that we do not presume the class of models represented by (11), (12), (18),
and (19) contains the true model. We admit that the model of the private
agents is misspeciﬁed. For this reason, we call our equilibrium concept
self-conﬁrming equilibrium.
Definition 3.1. The pair (c,φ) is a self-conﬁrming equilibrium if
the distribution of (πt,r t,z t) generated by (1), (2), (4), (7), (8) and (10)
conditioned on (c,φ) is equal to the conditional distribution of (πt,r t,z t)
calculated from the private agent’s model through (11), (12), (18), and
(19).
Self-conﬁrming equilibrium is milder than rational expectations equilib-
rium because the agents do not need to know the actual model entertained
by the government. Still, the private agents have to know the equilibrium
distribution of (πt,r t,z t) in order to calculate the equilibrium value of
(c,φ). We shall relax this requirement later, when we examine the learning
model.
We rearrange equations (1) and (2) as
·
zd
t
πd
t
¸
=
"
σ
κφπ+σ
1−βφπ
κφπ+σ
κσ
κφπ+σ
κ+βσ
κφπ+σ
#· ˜ Etzd
t+1
˜ Etπd
t+1
¸
+
"
σ
κφπ+σ
1
κφπ+σ
κσ
κφπ+σ
κ
κφπ+σ
#·
wt
ηt
¸
(20)12 JAMES BULLARD AND IN-KOO CHO
or more compactly as
·
zd
t
πd
t
¸
= B ˜ Etyt+1 + D
·
wt
ηt
¸
. (21)
Since the private agent’s model is conﬁn e dt ot h o s ew h i c hc a nb er e p r e -
sented in the form of (11) and (12),
˜ Etπd
t+1 = c21αwt (22)
and
˜ Etzd
t+1 = c11αwt. (23)
These expectations can be substituted into equation (21) to obtain the
actual values for zt and πt
·
zd
t
πd
t
¸
= B
·
c21αwt
c11αwt
¸
+ D
·
wt
ηt
¸
, (24)
or equivalently,
·
zd
t
πd
t
¸
= B
·
c11α 0
c21α 0
¸·
wt
ηt
¸
+ D
·
wt
ηt
¸
=
µ
B
·
c11α 0
c21α 0
¸
+ D
¶·
wt
ηt
¸
. (25)
By replacing the left hand side by (11) and (12) and arranging terms, we
have
µ·
c11 c12
c21 c22
¸
− B
·
c11α 0
c21α 0
¸
+ D
¶·
wt
ηt
¸
=0 (26)
which must hold for any value of (wt,ηt) in equilibrium. Thus, the equi-
librium value of c =( cij)2
i,j=1 obtains by solving
·
c11 c12
c21 c22
¸
− B
·
c11α 0
c21α 0
¸
+ D =0 (27)
as in Bullard and Mitra (2002). Let ce be the equilibrium value of c.
In a self-conﬁrming equilibrium, the slope ˆ φπ of the auxiliary regression
rt = ˆ φ0 + ˆ φππt (28)ESCAPIST POLICY RULES 13
must satisfy
ˆ φπ = φπ. (29)
Once φ is determined, the equilibrium target inﬂation rate can be calculated
according to (19) and (10). Then, the equilibrium target nominal interest
rate is given by the Fisher equation, and therefore, all endogenous variables
are determined in equilibrium.
Because the private sector correctly identiﬁes φπ a c c o r d i n gt oe q u a t i o n
(29), the self-conﬁrming equilibrium outcome is observationally equivalent
to the model in which the government is committed to the monetary policy
rule (4) with a ﬁxed inﬂation target.
3.2. Learnability
3.2.1. Decreasing gain algorithms
In a self-conﬁrming equilibrium, the private sector agents have to know
precisely the equilibrium distribution of πt and rt, which is too demanding
to be a descriptive model of an economic agent. Instead, let us assume
that the private sector agents recursively estimate c =( cij)2
i,j=1 and φ =
(φ0,φ π).T od i ﬀerentiate the equilibrium value from the estimated value,
we add a “hat” to the corresponding variable to denote the estimate, and by
time subscript t, we mean the estimate based on the information available
at the beginning of time t. Assuming that the private sector agents choose
the estimator to minimize the forecasting error, the estimators for c =
(cij)2
i,j=1 and φ =( φ0,φ π) evolve according to the following recursive least
squares formulae:
·
ˆ c11,t+1
ˆ c12,t+1
¸
=
·
ˆ c11,t
ˆ c12,t
¸
+ atΣ
−1
wη,t
·
wt
ηt
¸£
zd
t − ˆ c11,twt − ˆ c12,tηt
¤
, (30)
·
ˆ c21,t+1
ˆ c22,t+1
¸
=
·
ˆ c21,t
ˆ c22,t
¸
+ atΣ
−1
wη,t
·
wt
ηt
¸£
πd
t − ˆ c21,twt − ˆ c22,tηt
¤
, (31)
"
ˆ φ0,t+1
ˆ φπ,t+1
#
=
"
ˆ φ0,t
ˆ φπ,t
#
+ atΣ
−1
π,t
·
1
πt
¸³
rt − ˆ φ0,t − ˆ φπ,tπt
´
, (32)
Σwη,t+1 = Σwη,t + at
µ·
w2
t wtηt
wtηt η2
t
¸
− Σwη,t
¶
, (33)14 JAMES BULLARD AND IN-KOO CHO
and
Σπ,t+1 = Σπ,t + at
µµ
1 πt
πt π2
t
¶
− Σπ,t
¶
, (34)
where at > 0 is the gain sequence, which is set as
at =
1
t
(35)
for the recursive least squares learning algorithm.
An important question is whether and when the agent can learn the
self-conﬁrming equilibrium through the recursive least squares learning al-
gorithm.
Definition 3.2. (Evans and Honkapohja (2001)) A self-conﬁrming
equilibrium (ce,φ
e) is learnable if there is a µ>0 such that, if (ˆ c0, ˆ φ0) is
in a µ-neighborhood of (ce,φ
e),t h e n
(ˆ ct, ˆ φt) → (ce,φ
e) (36)
with probability 1 where (ˆ ct, ˆ φt) is generated by the least squares learning
algorithm described above.
In order to show that the least squares learning algorithm converges,
we borrow the machinery developed for stochastic approximation.13 To
simplify notation, let
xt =

 

ˆ ct
ˆ φt
col(Σwη,t)
col(Σπ,t)

 
 (37)
and
vt =
·
wt
ηt
¸
(38)
and write the recursive formula (30), (31), (32), (33) and (34) compactly
as
xt+1 = xt + atQ(xt,v t). (39)
Remark 3.1. It is a convention to contain xt in a compact set, be-
cause the decision maker can easily identify that the estimator is out of the
13See, for example, Kushner and Yin (1997).ESCAPIST POLICY RULES 15
reasonable range if it becomes too large or too small. The most common
method is to use the projection facility to contain xt in a compact set.14
Let xt =( x1,t,...,x  ,t) ∈ < .D e ﬁne
Λ =
  Y
k=1
[xk, ¯ xk] (40)
w h e r ew ec h o o s exk and ¯ xk so that xe is contained in the interior of Λ and
along the boundary of Λ, the gradient induced by equation (44) below is
pointing to the interior of Λ.T h a t i s , i f xt ∈ Λ but xt+1 6∈ Λ according
to (39), then xt+1 is “projected” back into some point in the interior of Λ.
T h u s ,w eh a v et oa d j u s txt+1 according to the projection facility. Let
xt+1 = λ(xt + atQ(xt,v t)) (41)
be the “adjusted” learning algorithm by incorporating the projection facil-
ity λ. Although the selection of Λ is arbitrary and requires some knowledge
about the location of xe, we can usually choose Λ suﬃciently large to in-
clude all “reasonable” values of xt in practice. The role of the projection
facility is only to ensure that xt i sc o n t a i n e di nac o m p a c ts e t . T h u s ,i n
order to simplify notation, we shall drop the projection facility λ for the
rest of the paper from the recursive formula, and instead, assume that there
is a compact set Λ ⊂ such that
xt ∈ Λ ∀t ≥ 1. (42)
The ﬁrst step is to extract the determinate dynamics that is a reasonable
approximation of the stochastic dynamics. Deﬁne
¯ Q(x)= l i m
T→∞
1
T
E
"
T X
t=1
Q(xt,v t)
#
. (43)
By the mean dynamics, we mean the ordinary diﬀerential equation (ODE)
˙ x = ¯ Q(x) (44)
which is often called the associated ODE. Since the dynamics of the indi-
vidual components are crucial for later analysis, it is useful to write down
14See, for example, Marcet and Sargent (1989) and Woodford (1990).16 JAMES BULLARD AND IN-KOO CHO
the associated ODE for each component:
" ˙ ˆ φ0
˙ ˆ φπ
#
= Σ−1×
"
ρ − ˆ φ0 +( 1− ˆ φπ)(γ0 + γ1ˆ φπ)
(φπ − ˆ φπ)σ2
π +( γ0 + γ1φπ)
³
ρ − ˆ φ0 +( 1− ˆ φπ)(γ0 + γ1ˆ φπ)
´
#
(45)
˙ Σ =
·
1 γ0 + γ1ˆ φπ
γ0 + γ1ˆ φπ (γ0 + γ1ˆ φπ)2 + σ2
π
¸
− Σ (46)
where
σ2
π =
σ2
 
1 − α2. (47)
The self-conﬁrming equilibrium is the outcome that causes the right hand
side of the ODE to vanish:
ˆ φπ = φπ, (48)
ˆ φ0 = ρ +( 1− φπ)(γ0 + γ1φπ), (49)
and
Σ =
·
1 γ0 + γ1ˆ φπ
γ0 + γ1ˆ φπ (γ0 + γ1ˆ φπ)2 + σ2
π
¸
. (50)
This proves that if the learning process converges, the private sector agents
learn the true attitude of the government toward inﬂation, φπ.
Kushner and Yin (1998) present the general conditions under which the
stochastic recursive algorithms converge to the stable points of the associ-
ated ODE. We state the key result of Kushner and Yin (1998) adapted for
our model:
Theorem 3.1. Suppose that the following conditions are satisﬁed: (1)
at > 0, at → 0,
PT
t=1 at →∞as T →∞and
P∞
t=1 a2
t < ∞,( 2 )vt
is a martingale diﬀerence with bounded second moments, (3) Q in (39) is
Lipschitz continuous, (4) The associated ODE (44) has a stable point xe
with a basin of attraction, (5) There is a compact set Λ ⊂ such that xt ∈ Λ
inﬁnitely many times with probability 1. Then, for any initial condition
x0 ∈ Λ for (39), xt → xe with probability 1.ESCAPIST POLICY RULES 17
It is straightforward to verify every condition for Theorem 3.1. From the
right hand side of (44), we can calculate the stationary point of (44) where
ˆ φπ,t = φπ (51)
must hold. That is, in a self-conﬁrming equilibrium, the private sector
agents correctly infer the degree of the government’s hawkishness toward
inﬂation. Following Bullard and Mitra (2002), we can verify that the sta-
tionary point of the associated ODE (i.e., the self-conﬁrming equilibrium)
is stable if
φπ > 1. (52)
Hence, as long as the government is committed to an active Taylor-type
rule, the least squares learning algorithm converges to the self-conﬁrming
equilibrium. Furthermore, by following Bullard and Mitra (2002), we can
also show that if
φπ < 1, (53)
then the self-conﬁrming equilibrium is not stable. From Evans and Honkapo-
hja (2001) and Bullard and Mitra (2002), we know that xt → xe with
probability 0 if φπ < 1.
If the private sector agents estimate (c,φ) according to the least squares
learning algorithm, then the gain sequence at for the recursive algorithm
satisﬁes the conditions of Theorem 3.1 and (ˆ ct, ˆ φt) converges to the self-
conﬁrming equilibrium with probability 1. Since the distribution of (ˆ ct, ˆ φt)
converges to the mass point concentrated at (c,φ), the linearly approxi-
mated model is indeed an excellent way of analyzing the asymptotic prop-
erties of the original (non-linear) model.
The stability of the self-conﬁrming equilibrium demonstrates that the
observational equivalence between the policy rule (4) with a ﬁxed inﬂation
target and the monetary policy rule with a time-varying target is quite
robust. In the self-conﬁrming equilibrium, one cannot reject the hypothesis
that the government is using an active Taylor-type rule with a ﬁxed inﬂation
target. And, there is no possibility of escape so long as the private sector
agents use recursive least squares.18 JAMES BULLARD AND IN-KOO CHO
3.2.2. Fixed gain algorithms
However, in the least squares learning algorithm characterized by the
gain sequence at =1 /t, the private sector agents presume that the under-
lying economy is stationary so that the data observed a long time ago is
just as useful as the most recently observed data, and consequently, they
assign equal weight to all past data. But if the private sector agents are a
little suspicious about the stationarity of the underlying economy, the least
squares learning algorithm is no longer a sensible way of estimating (c,φ).
In particular, if the agent observes that the estimated hawkishness of the
government toward inﬂation is ﬂuctuating, the stationarity of the economy
and the commitment of the government to respond aggressively to inﬂation
is called into question.
Under this hypothesis, a sensible learning algorithm assigns a larger
weight to more recently observed data. One simple way of implementing
this idea is to set
at = a>0 (54)
for a small positive constant a, so that the private sector agents can dis-
count the inﬂuence of past observations at a geometric rate. In contrast to
the least squares learning algorithm in which at is decreasing, we call the
learning algorithm with at = a a ﬁxed gain algorithm.
O n ec a n n o ta p p l yT h e o r e m3 . 1t os h o wt h ec o n v e r g e n c et ot h es e l f -
conﬁrming equilibrium with probability 1 for a ﬁxed gain algorithm, be-
cause one of the conditions of the theorem regarding at is violated. Yet,
we can still prove that the invariance distribution converges to the self-
conﬁrming equilibrium in a weaker sense.
Theorem 3.2. (Benveniste, Metivier and Priouret (1990)) For each
a>0, the recursive learning algorithm has an invariance distribution of
(ˆ ct, ˆ φt). This invariance distribution converges weakly to the self-conﬁrming
equilibrium which is the stable point of the associated ODE.
For a suﬃciently small a>0, (ˆ ct, ˆ φt) must be distributed around the
stable point of the associated ODE. Thus, many of the properties foundESCAPIST POLICY RULES 19
in the least squares learning algorithm are carried over to the ﬁxed gain
algorithm.
Surprisingly, with at ﬁxed to a small value a>0, the dynamics of (ˆ ct, ˆ φt)
reveals rare but recurrent escapes from the self-conﬁrming outcome (the
stable solution of the associated ODE). In particular, ˆ φπ,t escapes from the
stable point φπ > 1,a n dm o v e st o w a r d1, before returning to a neighbor-
hood of φπ > 1. Recall that the government is committed to a ﬁxed value
φπ > 1, which means that its attitude toward inﬂation remains equally
hawkish at all times throughout the entire episode. But because the per-
ceived hawkishness of the government’s attitude toward inﬂation is ﬂuctu-
ating over time due to the shocks in the system, the target inﬂation rate
is also ﬂuctuating. As a result, as we will see, the inﬂation rate and the
nominal interest rate may stay away from the stable point of the associated
ODE (the self-conﬁrming equilibrium) for an extended period.
We begin our analysis of this phenomenon with a quantitative illustra-
tion.
3.3. A quantitative illustration
The main qualitative feature of our simulation–that the system even-
tually displays a large deviation from the self-conﬁrming equilibrium–is
quite robust across parameter choices. But for purposes of illustration, we
used the following parameter values. For the structural parameters, we
took the calibrated values from Woodford (1999), σ =0 .157,κ=0 .024,
and we set β = .9975. This means that the annualized real interest rate,
ρ = β
−1−1, is one percent in this example. We set δ0 = −ρ. In the stochas-
tic processes, we set α = .9,σ   = .00372, and ση = .002. This represents a
high degree of serial correlation and a low level of noise in the system rela-
tive to Woodford (1999). This is mainly so that the noise does not interfere
with our observation of the escape dynamics. We keep the constant gain
factor small by setting a = .005. We set δ1 =1 /500, a low value that shows
how mild the inﬂation target dependence on private sector beliefs can be.
This leaves only the coeﬃcient in the government’s Taylor-type rule to be
set. We want to choose a value that is consistent with both determinacy
and learnability in the Bullard and Mitra (2002) analysis. This requires
roughly that φπ > 1 in this model. Of course, we want to analyze an active20 JAMES BULLARD AND IN-KOO CHO
Taylor-type rule as well, which also means φπ > 1. Accordingly, we set
φπ =5 . In conjunction with δ1 =1 /500, this parameter choice means that
the government’s target inﬂation rate at the self-conﬁrming equilibrium is
2.997 percent. The target nominal interest rate is then 4.0 percent for this
example.
The escape outcome will turn out to be a situation where the perceived
hawkishness of monetary policy, ˆ φπ,t, is consistent with a Fisher relation
instead of with a Taylor-type rule. In the Fisher relation, nominal interest
rates move one-for-one with inﬂation, so that ˆ φπ,t =1 , far more passive
than the actual value of φπ =5 . The escape outcome is therefore charac-
terized by values of −20 b a s i sp o i n t sf o rt h ei n ﬂation rate, and 80 basis
points for the nominal interest rate.
Figure 2 shows the nominal interest rate dynamics for this example, in
a simulation of 3,500 periods initialized at the self-conﬁrming equilibrium.
The system remains in a neighborhood of the self-conﬁrming equilibrium
for about 3,000 periods before an abrupt escape to the low nominal interest
rate, low inﬂation outcome occurs. The low nominal interest rate outcome
is not a self-conﬁrming equilibrium, because the private sector holds the
belief ˆ φπ =1when in fact the government’s policy is unchanged and has
φπ =5 . Therefore, even though it is not apparent from the ﬁgure, the
system does not remain at the escape outcome indeﬁnitely. Instead, the
private sector gradually begins to discover that its estimate of monetary
hawkishness is too low, and they begin to revise their estimate away from
one and toward the actual value φπ. This sends the system on a climb back
toward the self-conﬁrming equilibrium.15
Figure 2 displays an abrupt escape from the self-conﬁrming equilibrium,
in the context of 3,500 observations of the nominal interest rate. In Figure
3, the dynamics of the nominal interest rate and the inﬂation rate are
shown near the date of the escape–to obtain this ﬁgure, we selected 100
observations on the nominal interest rate as well as inﬂation for the period
near the escape depicted in Figure 2. Figure 3 shows that the escape
dynamics are abrupt, but not unrealistically so when compared to the
15This ﬁgure makes it seem like an escape would hardly ever occur. However, some-
what larger values of the gain a cause escapes to occur much more frequently.ESCAPIST POLICY RULES 21
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Figure 2.  An abrupt departure
FIG. 2. A large deviation from the self-conﬁrming equilibrium nominal inter-
est rate. The system maintains interest rates in a neighborhood of 4.0 percent
for many periods, but eventually the system departs to a low nominal interest
rate outcome.
actual Japanese data in Figure 1. The nominal interest rate falls from
about 4 percent to just below 1 percent over a period of 16 quarters or
so. The inﬂation rate also falls during this period. The inﬂation rate is
relatively smooth in the ﬁgure because we do not have an inﬂation-speciﬁc
shock in the model.
Despite the fact that the self-conﬁrming equilibrium is globally stable
under the learning algorithm, the model admits recurrent epochs of low
inﬂation and low nominal interest rates. Our main interest is to understand
the dynamics away from the stable self-conﬁrming equilibrium. Because the
convex Taylor-type rule complicates the analysis signiﬁcantly, we prefer to
use the linearly approximated model to investigate the escape dynamics.
However, we ﬁrst need to examine whether the linearly approximated model
is a sensible one to use to investigate the dynamics around the stationary
point as well as away from the stationary point of the associated ODE.
3.3.1. Heuristics
Before presenting a formal analysis, it may be instructive to see the
mechanism that triggers the escape observed in Figure 2. Figure 4 depicts22 JAMES BULLARD AND IN-KOO CHO
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Figure 3.  Escape dynamics
FIG. 3. A closer look at the escape dynamics. The nominal interest rate
falls sharply over a period of say, 20 quarters, close to the observed timing in
Japan documented in Figure 1. Inﬂation also falls, from just below three percent
to a slight rate of deﬂation. Inﬂation is relatively smooth because we have no
inﬂation-speciﬁcs h o c ki nt h em o d e l .
the self-conﬁrming equilibrium in the linearly approximated model. The
linearly approximated Taylor-type rule has a slope steeper than the Fisher
equation which is a line with slope 1 passing through −ρ on the π-axis.
The intersection of the linearized Taylor-type rule and the Fisher equation
is the self-conﬁrming equilibrium outcome. From equations (11) and (12),
we know that (πd
t,rd
t) is distributed around the self-conﬁrming equilibrium.
Since the estimated Taylor-type rule (18) must have the same slope as the
(true) linearized Taylor-type rule, (πd
t,r d
t) must be distributed along the
linearized Taylor-type rule.
Since the self-conﬁrming equilibrium is stable, we can ﬁnd a small neigh-
borhood around the equilibrium in which the gradient of the associated
ODE is pointing toward the equilibrium. That is, there exists µ>0 such
that ∀x ∈ Nµ(xs),w h e r exs is the stationary solution of the associated
ODE, such that
d
dt
|x − xs|
2 < 0. (55)ESCAPIST POLICY RULES 23
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FIG. 4. Heuristic escape dynamics. Data generated along BC leads private
sector agents to estimate a less hawkish monetary policy (a regression line with
a ﬂatter slope). This causes the inﬂation target to fall, reinforcing the belief in a
less hawkish policy. This process continues until the escape outcome is reached.
It must be pointed out that the notion of stability does not require that the
gradient induced by the ODE points to the self-conﬁrming equilibrium. It
suﬃces that xt can return to the small neighborhood of the self-conﬁrming
equilibrium and remains there after a certain ﬁnite period. Indeed, in
our case, the path returning to the neighborhood of the self-conﬁrming
equilibrium may take a long detour, and (55) generally fails outside of the
small neighborhood of the stable solution xs.
Because the self-conﬁrming equilibrium is stable, we begin by supposing
that a cluster of data has been generated about the equilibrium point. We
then imagine that for some reason (as we will explain shortly), ˆ φπ,t has
decreased. Despite the fact that the government is actually maintaining
t h es a m ed e g r e eo fh a w k i s h n e s s ,t h eperceived attitude of the government
toward inﬂation can change. Because the private sector agents conjecture
the target inﬂation rate according to (19), the perceived target inﬂation
rate also drops. Then, as the government incorporates the private sector’s
belief through (10), the actual target also shifts toward the left of the self-
conﬁrming equilibrium in Figure 4.24 JAMES BULLARD AND IN-KOO CHO
Once this lowering of the inﬂation target has occurred, the new realiza-
tions of (πd
t,rd
t) will be generated around the new inﬂation target according
to (7) and (8 ). Since the target inﬂation and the target interest rate must
satisfy the Fisher relation, they must stay along the 45 degree, Fisher re-
lation line passing through −ρ on the π-axis in Figure 4. As the private
agents are ﬁtting the regression equation to the observed data, the esti-
mated slope must converge toward 1, because one cluster of data is around
the self-conﬁrming equilibrium and the other cluster of data is away from
the equilibrium along the Fisher relation, which has slope 1.
As ˆ φπ,t becomes smaller, π 
t and ¯ πt again become still smaller following
the same process described above, so that the inﬂation and nominal interest
rate targets are even further away from the self-conﬁrming equilibrium. As
most data are accumulated along the Fisher relation, the estimated slope
must continue to converge toward 1. The limit of this process has the target
inﬂation rate determined accordingly:
¯ πt = π∗
t = δ0 + δ1 (56)
which is precisely the lower bound of target inﬂation found in the simula-
tions.
Since ˆ φπ,t =1is not a stable point of the associated ODE, the mean
dynamics starts to take over to push ˆ φπ,t back to the self-conﬁrming equi-
librium ˆ φπ,t = φπ > 1.
It remains to explain what kind of a sequence of outcomes can trigger
(πt,r t) away from the small neighborhood of the self-conﬁrming equilibrium
in which the gradient induced by the associated ODE is pointing toward the
self-conﬁrming equilibrium. By the deﬁnition of the associated ODE, the
outcome must stay around the self-conﬁrming equilibrium on average. The
weak law of large numbers indicates that the outcome must stay around the
mean with a large probability. Essentially, we have to identify a sequence
of unusual events that pushes ˆ φπ,t away from the small neighborhood of
φπ > 1 in order to explain what events can trigger the episode of escape
from the self-conﬁrming equilibrium.
Although the simulations were carried out under the assumption that
vt =( wt,ηt) has a Gaussian distribution, it is much more convenient toESCAPIST POLICY RULES 25
explain the key intuition of escape if we assume that the perturbations have
discrete, binomial distributions. For the sake of discussion, let us assume
that ηt can have ση > 0 with probability 0.5, and −ση with probability
0.5. Similarly, assume that  t = −σ  or σ  with an equal probability.
Since wt and ηt can have two diﬀerent values respectively, (πt,r t) can
have 4 diﬀerent realization around the self-conﬁrming equilibrium as de-
picted in Figure 4 by the points A, B, C, and D. The convex hull of those
four realizations forms a parallelogram centered around the self-conﬁrming
equilibrium. By connecting the self-conﬁrming equilibrium to each one of
the four points, we can see how each realization can change the slope of
ˆ φπ,t. Let us call the vector obtained by connecting the self-conﬁrming equi-
librium to one of the four realization of the outcomes a shifting vector. We
then have four shifting vectors. Since the convex hull of the four points
forms a parallelogram, two shifting vectors must be linearly dependent, as
they are pointing in opposite directions.
Let us draw a small ball around the self-conﬁrming equilibrium. We
need to ﬁnd the sequence of outcomes that can reach the boundary of the
ball with the minimal steps. More precisely, ﬁx a point on the boundary
of the ball, and ﬁnd a sequence of “unusual” events that lead to a small
neighborhood of the exit point with minimal steps.
Because the four shifting vectors are two pairs of linearly dependent
vectors, if one chooses three or more vectors out of four to generate an
escape path from the self-conﬁrming equilibrium, some of the vectors cancel
out. In order to minimize the waste of time for escape, any path that
can reach a small neighborhood of a ﬁxed point on the boundary of the
small ball around the self-conﬁrming equilibrium must be generated by at
most two out of four diﬀerent shifting vectors around the self-conﬁrming
equilibrium. A careful examination of Figure 4 reveals that among all six
possible combinations of two shifting vectors out of four, exactly one pair
of shifting vectors pushes ˆ φπ,t below φπ. This is the sequence of “unusual”
events that most likely trigger the escape out of the small neighborhood of
the self-conﬁrming equilibrium.
O n em a yw o n d e rw h yt h ee s t i m a t e ds l o p eˆ φπ,t does not escape upward
from φπ.T o s e e t h i s , ﬁrst recall that as the estimated slope becomes26 JAMES BULLARD AND IN-KOO CHO
larger, the perceived and actual inﬂation targets also increase. Thus, the
center of the distribution of data is shifting toward the right of the self-
conﬁrming equilibrium in Figure 4. However, as more data are generated
along the Fisher relation, which has slope 1, the estimated slope must
converge toward 1. This lowers the inﬂation target, tending to move the
system back toward the self-conﬁrming equilibrium. Thus, whenever there
i sa ne s c a p e ,i tm u s th a p p e ni ns u c haw a yt h a tt h et a r g e ti n ﬂation falls
from the self-conﬁrming equilibrium level.
3.3.2. Formal analysis
Because the slope of the estimated Taylor-type rule, ˆ φπ,t plays a vital
role in determining the target inﬂation rate, we shall focus on the dynamics
of ˆ φπ,t. The intercept ˆ φ0,t is determined as the regression residual, once
ˆ φπ,t is determined. Let φ
s be the self-conﬁrming equilibrium outcome.
Similarly, let φ
r =( ρ,1).I f φ = φ
r, then the estimated Taylor-type rule
coincides with the Fisher relation.
Fix ρφ > 0 and deﬁne
Ωρφ =
n
∃T<∞,φ t 6∈ Nρφ(φ
s)&φ1 = φ
s
o
. (57)
By following the analysis of Dupuis and Kushner (1989), one can show that
there exists S∗(ρφ) ∈ (0,∞) such that
− lim
a→0
alogPr
³
Ωρφ
´
≤ S∗(ρφ) (58)
which implies that Ωρφ is a rare event whose probability vanishes at the
rate of e−S∗(ρφ)/a,a sa → 0, φt converges to φ
s in distribution. Let Σv be
the covariance matrix for the perturbation vt.
Proposition 3.1. ∀ρφ > 0,
lim
a→0
Pr
³
φt ∈ Nρφ(φ
r)
¯ ¯ ¯Ωρφ
´
=1 . (59)
Proof. As φt is moving away from φ
s,t h et a r g e t(πt,rt) also moves
along the Fisher relation. Thus, (πt,r t) is realized around the target, andESCAPIST POLICY RULES 27
the deviation (πd
t,rd
t) from the target is bounded by v under the ﬁrst (tem-
porary) assumption. Abusing notation, we can write
|rt − πt − ρ| ≤ v ∀t ≥ 1. (60)
Fix a small ρφ > 0. Since the target is moving smoothly with respect
to the changes of φt, we can choose a corresponding ρπ > 0 such that
φt ∈ Nρφ(φ
s) if and only if πt ∈ Nρπ(πs).D e ﬁne T(ρφ) as the ﬁrst time
when
φt 6∈ Nρφ(φ
s) (61)
and similarly, let T(ρφ/2) be the ﬁrst time when
φt 6∈ Nρφ/2(φ
s). (62)
Since φT(ρφ) minimizes the (weighted) forecasting error, φT(ρφ) solves
min
(φ0,φπ)
(1 − a)
T(ρφ) X
j=1
aj−1
h
rT(ρφ) − φ0 − φππT(ρφ)−j+1
i2
. (63)
We can write
(1 − a)
T(ρφ) X
j=1
aj−1
h
rT(ρφ) − φ0 − φππT(ρφ)−j+1
i2
=
(1 − aT(ρφ/2))
T(ρφ)−T(ρφ/2) X
j=1
aj−1
h
rT(ρφ) − φ0 − φππT(ρφ)−j+1
i2
+ aT(ρφ)−T(ρφ/2)
T(ρφ/2) X
j=1
aj−1
h
rT(ρφ) − φ0 − φππT(ρφ)−j+1
i2
. (64)
Note that the second term vanishes as a → 0. Instead of the entire objective
function, let us focus on the ﬁrst term of the above equation, and examine
a“ s i m p l i ﬁed” minimization problem:
min
(φ0,φπ)
(1 − aT(ρφ/2))
T(ρφ/2)−T(ρφ/2) X
j=1
aj−1
h
rT(ρφ) − φ0 − φππT(ρ)−j+1
i2
.
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Let {ˆ φ
a
t} be the sequence of estimators obtained from the “original” min-
imization problem (63) and {ˆ φ
m,a
t } be the sequence obtained from the
“simpliﬁed” minimization problem (65). We add a to the superscript of φt
in order to emphasize the role of the gain sequence. Since the objective
function of (63) converges uniformly to the objective function of (65) which
is strictly concave, the sample path
n
ˆ φ
a
t
o
converges uniformly to
n
ˆ φ
m,a
t
o
:
lim
a→0
¯ ¯ ¯ˆ φ
a
t − ˆ φ
m,a
a
¯ ¯ ¯ =0 ∀t ∈ {T(ρφ/2),...,T(ρφ)}. (66)
In (65), the agent is ﬁtting a regression line to the data generated around
the Fisher relations:
Etπt = πt,E trt = rt, and rt = πt + ρ. (67)
By the deﬁnition of T(ρφ),
¯ ¯ ¯πT(ρφ) − πs
¯ ¯ ¯ = ρπ (68)
which is ﬁxed. Since the feedback rule is a smooth function of φt, πt must
be scattered between πT(ρφ) and πs, and the number of the data points
must increase as a → 0. Hence, as a → 0, the estimated slope ˆ φ
m,a
π,T(ρφ)
from (65) must converges to the slope of the Fisher relation in distribution:
ˆ φ
m,a
a,T(ρφ) → 1 (69)
weakly as a → 0. Combining (66) and (69), we have the desired conclu-
sion.
Note that the proof of Proposition 3.1 applies both to the original system
and to the linearly approximated system. Thus, the tail of the linearly
approximated model is “close” to the tail of the original model in the sense
that conditioned on the event that ˆ φt moves away from the center of the
distribution, the most likely place of escape is φ
r.
The proof of Proposition 3.1 reveals the two key elements that generate
the escape dynamics. The ﬁr s te l e m e n ti st h eﬁxed gain algorithm that
reﬂects the small amount of suspicion on the part of private sector agents
about the stationarity of the underlying economy. With the ﬁxed gainESCAPIST POLICY RULES 29
algorithm, the inﬂuence of the past data observed before T(ρφ/2) is de-
preciated at a geometric rate, which is crucial in obtaining (66). With the
least squares estimation in which every data is assigned the equal weight,
the data observed before T(ρφ/2) can maintain the same level of inﬂuence
to ˆ φ
a
T(ρφ) as a → 0, which keeps the estimator around the self-conﬁrming
equilibrium instead of trigger i n gt h ee s c a p ed y n a m i c s .
The second element is the misspeciﬁcation of the model and the feedback.
The auxiliary regression (18) presumes φ0 as a constant. However, φ0
reﬂects the location of the center of the distribution, which is the target
inﬂation and the target nominal interest rate. Since both variables are
changing according to the government’s feedback rule, the agent’s model,
especially (18), is misspeciﬁed.
However, the misspeciﬁed model alone is not enough to trigger the es-
cape dynamics. The unusual dynamics are triggered only when the mis-
speciﬁcation is combined with the feedback rule of an agent, in this case,
the government. Once the private sector becomes pessimistic about the
government’s attitude toward inﬂation (lower ˆ φπ), the private sector’s pes-
simism is reﬂected in the government’s shift of the target level of inﬂation,
even though its attitude toward inﬂation φπ remains unchanged. However,
as the data is generated along the Fisher relation, the shifted target is
interpreted by the private sector as less hawkish attitude of the govern-
ment, because the estimated slope ˆ φπ is lowered toward 1. This process
is self-reinforcing until the estimated slope coincides with the slope of the
Fisher relation. This is the point where the escape dynamics stops and the
mean dynamics takes over to push the private sector’s belief back to the
self-conﬁrming equilibrium.
4. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have developed a theory of near-zero nominal interest
rates, as observed in Japan in the 1990s and the U.S. in the 1930s. Our
theory is that the economy inadvertently “slides down a Fisher relation”
because of misunderstanding concerning the nature of the government’s
inﬂation target. The theory is based on the existence of a self-conﬁrming
equilibrium in which inﬂation and nominal interest rates are relatively high.30 JAMES BULLARD AND IN-KOO CHO
Our dynamic system can make sudden departures from that equilibrium
towards a persistent low inﬂation, low nominal interest rate outcome which
looks like observed “liquidity trap” episodes in major industrialized coun-
tries. These escape dynamics are a consequence of the large deviation
properties of our system. We have stressed that three key ingredients are
required to generate the escape dynamics. The ﬁrst of these is that the
private sector’s model of the government’s policy is (subtly) misspeciﬁed.
The second element is that there is some feedback from beliefs to policy
actions. And ﬁnally, the private sector needs to learn using a constant gain
algorithm, which might be interpreted as allowing these agents to acknowl-
edge their own uncertainty concerning the system in which they operate.
With these elements in place, we showed that the long-run behavior of our
small macroeconomic model includes recurrent visits to the “liquidity trap”
outcome, even though that outcome is not a self-conﬁrming equilibrium of
the system.
From the government’s point of view, perhaps little can be done to stop
the private sector from continually using available data to update their es-
timates of the policy rule the government uses. And similarly, the nature
of the econometric procedure the private sector employs may also be some-
thing the government cannot reliably inﬂuence. However, the third element
needed to generate escape dynamics in this model is the feedback from pri-
vate sector beliefs to the inﬂation target. If the government could credibly
commit to a constant long-run inﬂation target, there could be no escape
f r o mt h eu n i q u es e l f - c o n ﬁrming equilibrium in this model. A number of
central banks have, in recent years, begun to state their inﬂation target
more explicitly, although not the Bank of Japan or the Federal Reserve.
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